J)art.ly res1)onsihlc for the programs' failures.1 Notwithstanding this colisensus, however, there has been little attempt to investigate the inechaiiisms by which a lack of credibility actually makes failure more likely. This paper represents a iitore formal attempt to inject the issue of im)erfcctly credible governnient policy into the discussion of tariff reduction. We iiivestigate the intertemporal incentives in consumption and the distortions in output which are gellerate(l by fears that the liberalization program will be short lived. In addition, we try to rank ex)licitly coitiinercial policy alternatives by their effects on welfare, the allocation of real resources, and the level of cre(hil)ility. The analysis intentionally focuses on countries (such as iiiany LDCs today) which have limited access to international financial markets, in the sense that unanticipated current. account deficits iiiust be financed by reserve depletion instead of by borrowing. The cre(lil)ility of trade reform is perhaps most important in these countries because of their dual histories of policy reversals and severe trade restrictions.
Our interest lies not just in how (Ioubt.s about the p('r1I11e11ce of trade reforms contribute to the eventual reinstatement of trade l)aI'riers. We also consider the effects of alternative, slower speeds of liberalization on the equilibrium level of credibility. Even though such slower rates of reform are second-best in that they represent clear deviations from the neoclassical optimum, they arc desirable here because they turn out to lessen the dist.ortioii gciierated l)y the lack of perfect credibility. Indeed, it turns out that in the niodel below, governuients with credibility problems should not pursue policies that eliminate tariffs right, away. Such a findiiig is particularly surprising in the context of our optimizing two-period fraiiiework, which tends to l)ias the results toward complete and instantaneous liberalization even as compared with more stali(lard macro-economic treatnieiits.2 In the modern intertemporal approach, for example, a 1)'1J1ia1i('I1t tariff reduction is painless in the sense that it does miot result in a tra(le deficit. Once tariffs are zero, there is no mtertemporal incentive to deviate from the neoclassical optiiinimii of balance (l tra(le.3 The simple two-period model below treats a country winch has i'ecently removed its trade Dornhnsch (1984) , in particular alludes to the int.ertomporal efforts geuieratel lv oxlu.rtat.jouls of higher future tariffs. 2 Examples of the approach iaso-l in this paper include Dixit aunt Norniaui (lost)). Sveiiscoui and 11 aziui (1983) , Il azili aud Svensson (1983) , Edwards and van Wijnhergen (1983) , and van Wijuhergen (1084).
3As van Wijnhergen (1983) points out, tariff reductions in LDC's may 1mph aIsolut.e decline in the return to capital, sluice umports in those countries are often relatively capital iuit.eusivo. In the iiiterteuruiorat ai,i>roacli. removing tariffs once and for all crniltl then reduce investment, leading to an m.provernent in the current arcoiuuit.
restrictions, so that tariffs are zero in the first period. If agents l)elieve that the government may be forced to abandon the liberalization in period two, consluners are iiicliiiecl to substitute consumption toward the first period and producers will on average divert more resources toward the inefficient import sector. These two sources of additional spending lead to a current account deficit, which in turn will make the government more susceptible to external shocks that deplete reserves. A higher percentage of the time, the authorities will lw forced to levy tariffs in an effort to cut imports, thereby generating badly needed hard-currency reserves. In this way, agents' disbelief that the policy will endure becomes self-fulfilling.
After describing the model in section 1, section 2 goes on to derive a rational expectations equilibrium in which the current accoimt deficit, level of welfare, and the probability of collapse are endogenous. Next, we consider a more gradual liberalization program which employs I)oSitive first-period tariffs. It is possible to show that gradualism improves welfare, lowers the current account deficit, and raises the probability that free trade will ultimately prevail. There is a unique, positive first-period tariff which is welfare optimal.
For iiiany developing countries today, particiilaiIy those with large external (lebts, l)iflding restrictions on international borrowing and the scarcity of hard-currency reserves fix current accounts more or less exogenously. In section 4, the effects of imperfect credibility arc investigated when consumers cannot substitute toward current consluliptiomi by running a larger current account deficit.4 In these circumstances, the shadow value of saving miiust increase to equilibrate the expected marginal utility of real consumptioli in both periods. High real interest rates have in fact been a common feature of many recent liberalization attenij,ts. Here we find that more gradual speeds of liberalization will help bring down interest rates and shift production toward the export sector. Finally, section 5 concludes.
The Model
We employ a two-period model of a small country simitilar to that of Svensson and Razin (1983) , Razin and Svensson (1982) , and Edwards and van Wijnbergen (1983) . There are two goods, exports (x) and imports (rn), both of which are consumed and I)roduce(I. The small country is represented 41n a similar two period modcl, Edwards and van SS'ijnbergen (1983) investigate the optimal speed of liberalization for the case in which a binding external financing constraint, falls entirel on investment, anti secontl.perjoil tariffs are zero with certainty.
by a single consumer, who maximizes eX1)CCtC(I welfare. TV = TV('y, F), where 'y = y(Cm, c) denotes subutility in period one of the consiunptioii of imports. rfl,, an(l eXpOrts, ca.. Period two suhutility is expressed as I' = r(G,, C).5 ' and F are assmuned to have the expected utility property and are homothetic. Without loss of generality, ami I' can be chosen to be linearly homogeneous. Each period's expected suhutility has an associated imit CXI)eil(litllre function, ir afl(l H, which yields the minimum expenditure required to reach the unit level of expected slml)litility in that period, given current prices of imports and exports: lr(pm , , 1) = mm {pm Cm + pc,r : I < 'i( Cm, e) }, (i) ll(P70, P, 1) = miii {PIUCW + PC., : I < r(c01, C1)).
We can think of w an(1 H as the price of obtaining a single unit. of expected subutility in that period or as the price of a unit of real spending. 'y. F. Expressions for nominal spending are therefore iry and [IF, the price index times the measure of real consuinptioii in that. period.
The analogous intertemporal expenditure function, E(w, DH. TV), gives the minimum present discounted expenditure required to achieve a fixed level of expected welfare, for given levels of the price indexes, w and H: E(x, DH, TV) = miii {2r(p.m, pr)' + DH(Pm, 1)F : W < W(, r)},
where D = is the discount factor and z is the doniestic nominal interest rate. Overall welfare, W, is the expected utility of real consumption over 1)0th 1)eriOds.
We will use the well-known properties of the expenditure function that its first derivative with rcsI)cct to prices yields the Hicksian compensate(I (lelllan(I fuiiction for each gooi (here given for period one goods and imports, respectively):
Thioughout the paper we use lower case letters for period one vsrial,les ,itl upper cise letters for period two variables, From the Slutsky equation, the marginal propensity to spend tinies the change in expenditure with respect to welfare is equal to the second derivative of the exj)en(litlIr,' function with respect to price and welfare:
E1 a where c is the marginal proJ)ensity to spend in J)rriod one nut of a ('ilange in expenditure.
On the production side we define first-and secoild-1)erio(l (niliposite revenue functions (over exports and imports), q and Q, which are homogeneous of (legr(' one in each period's prices:
(v) where the own derivatives with reSI)ect to prices, q = ?i (pm Pr:K, L) aiid q2 = q2(p11,, p; K, L) are the first-period supply fimctions for imports and exports, respectively (and similarly for period two).
Expected Collapse of a Liberalization Program when Reserves are not Rationed
With this model in mind we consider a country which has just lil)rralize(l its trade account by elilllinating tariffs on imports. In order to focus on the prnl)lenls LDC's may face during such liberalizations, we assume that the cniuiti'y is credit constraint'cI iii that the I)rivate sector does not have direct access to to suppliers of foreign exchange. Instva(I, all l)orrowing in international capital markets is conducte(I by the government at the beginning of period one. The initial level of hard-currency reserves hieki by the goverilnient, 1?, inclu(les any external financing the government has been able to arrange, and is treated here as exogenously determjne(I (though in reality it is the outcome of a quasi-iiiai'ket bargaining process bctw('eli the goveriinjeitt and its creditors).
In these circumstances, the government must flulance any clitrent ac coinit deficit from its stock of reserves. (In the next section, we consider the case in which the goveriinuiif refuses or is unable to finance the entire current account deficit, and rations foreign exchange instead.) The government's reserves are also used to shliel(l the private sector frnmii lllIantici1)at(scl shocks to export revenues or import expenditures which occur during period oiie. Thus the ex post current account deficit, or the total reduction in governmneiit reserves, is the sum of the current accoiuit deficit the private sector chooses plus a random shock component:
( 1) where is distributed normally with mean 0 and Variaiic(' At the end of the first period, reserves are RTo focus on the possibility that the liberalization program will 1w abandoned, we assume the government follows a rule-of-thumb policy in deciding whether to impose second-period tariffs. The rule is that tariffs will be reimposed at their original pre-liberalizatioii level in period two if reserves at the end of the first period fall below sonic critical floor, Rmj,,: R -< I?,,.
(2) Tariffs remain at zero if equation (2) is not satisfied. The prol)al)ility that the liberalization I)i'ogram will 1)e reversed is just the probability that, equation (2) holds:
To keel) matters simple all(I to avoid aml)iguitics, we assume that. II,,, ,, is set equal to the difference between the initial level of reserves and the itiaximinu currciit account deficit. i.e., the deficit the private sector would choose if tariffs were to be rcinstate(l with probability one: z(..\ = 1).
(4)
Notice that even with a balanced! current account, there is still a nonzero plol)al)ility of reversal since:
The goverment's decision rule imnl)hes that the price of iniports in period two is olistributed Linomially:
where r1, is the tariff which will be ilnl)osc(l if the liberalization program fails. In the following analysis. we take r, to be given exogenoiisly.
Before we proceed, two other aspects of the model require elalmration. First, in this type of welfare-based general eqiiilibriuimi model, it is often useful to limit. the absolute niagnitucle of distortions (in our case, ii,). Large distortions result. ni large reductions in real income, and these income effects eventually swamp the subtler substitution effects we wish to study. So, for example, a small tariff in tile iiitia period encourages agents to shift. real expencIjftl'( towards the second period, when the tariff will be reiiioved. As we might expect, the current account in period one shows a surplus. In an attempt to offset the negative first-pei'jo(J welfare effccts of a somewhat larger temporary tariff, however, agents begin to shift real income back toward the period of the distortion. Utimately, when the tariff grows big enough, the a(Iditional borrowing in the first period is sufficient to swing the current account jut0 (1cfict. Although one could question the importance of such perverse marshalljan effects on the basis of their doubtful realism, we rule theni out here simply because tariffs are imposed by goveruiulieuits with the intention of improving (and not worsening) the cujrreuit accouuiit We do not wish to considei' po1icic that have effects systematically Opposite those expected by the authorities. Therefore, in the Spirit of the small (but fiuiite) tariff assumption we frequently express sufficient conditioums for the paper's results ill terms of upper bounds on the size of the tariff.
A second aspect of the uiiodel that requires additional explanat.joui is the treatment of uncertainty. Random prices are not usually ad(lcd to interteuull)oral general equiilibriujuij models l)Ccause of the additional complexity they bring. The stan(lar(I results from duality theory (Jo not generally hold when prices are random. For examj)le, there is no guarantee that the uiiatrix of Hicksian substitution terms is negative semflj(Iefillite In the present paper, however We are able to invoke a kind of weak-form certainty equivalence by exploiting the l)illonhial distrihutioj of import prices and the limitations imposed on time mulagnitucle of the tariff by the suuiall tariff assuini1)tioI. The intuition for this strategy is actually a simple one. Notice that the itli moment of the second-period tariff, can be written as () = (1 -t1)• For small tariffs and any given Prol)ahility that the liberalization will collapse, the higher-ordt. milommients of are insignificantly smuiall relative to the expectatiomi,
More precisely:
r-.O
The effects of a change in the prolm.bzlzty that tariffs will be levied in period two can be made arbitrarily close to the effects of a known change ill the future tariff. For snialt enough values of r, the signs of the sul)stituitjofl and income effects reuulajui the same as in the certainty case, even though the optimal choice varial)les become vastly more coiiiplex functions of the underlying utility and production functions. Since we make no atteuiipt in the PPer to specify the various elasticities of consumption am1 produc finn heyOli(I their repsec tive signs, all of the results remain general enough to apply to a variety of utility an(l production fiuictions. hideed, such a treatment of uncertainty seems particularly iiatiiral in this case, since, as we have alrea(ly noted, it is desirable to restrict our attention to small values of r, even without introducing uncert.aiiit.y. In the first appendix, we discuss this strategy for dealing with random future tariffs in more detail. We also demonstrate how a restriction on the size of r is sufficient to guaraittee that. the substitution effects (i.e. second derivatives of the expenditure fmiction with respect to eX1)ectCd prices) have the usual signs.
We are now ready to apply the model of the previous section, and t.o derive the rationally expected level of credibility, the correspon(Iilig current accoiuit, and the level of welfare under complete liberalization. The mt,ertemporal budget constraint of the country is:
Equation (8) requires that total expenditure is ((1ual to the 1)res(m1t (hiscounteci value of income plus tax revenues. Revenues generated by a future tariff will 1w rrhlrmle(l to the 1)rivate sector in the form of a lump sum transfer, T, where
Cm -Q 1 represeiits net imports, or cohisllml)tion minus (lomnestic 1)roduction of the imported gooi, awl r = 1\r, the expected future tariff. We assume that the country has no prior debt to the rest of the world (this could easily be added). Consequently. the cnrreiit a,ccoumt (leficit is eciual to consumption expenditure minus total revenues from production:
z=E1ir-q.
To see that an imperfectly credible conimnit,iiicnt to free trade leads to a sumboptimal allocation of resources, we t.ake the derivative of equation (8) with respect to ,\ aud use equatioii (0) to get:
where rD(E2Hjj + 111E22111D -()
Equation (11) gives the loss in welfare attributable to a Ilolizero 1)rol)al)ility that future tariffs will be levied. Welfare declines proportionally in the i)roi)ability of a policy reversal; indeed, integratjoi1 of equation (11) gives the familiar Harberget• result that the loss in welfare is J)rOpOrtional to the qtiare of the distortion (i.e., the lack of 1)CI'fCCt credibility).
The welfare effects of the Iluisaijocat ion of resources are slullIljlaIjze(l in . The ulumerator is proportional to the discoumfecj s1li)stitulfioli effect in co11s111111)fjoIj and production, holding welfare constant. The first terni in the mimerator, E2fl11 = is the change in the coml)ensatecl demand for period two imports from a change in price holding real period two expeiidituii'e constant. This captures the Zfltratemporal substitution in consum1)tioli of exj)nrts for imports. The second term, IIi E H1 D is the change in period two real si)en(Iing from a change in the J)rice of imports, weighted by the share of imports in spending. This terni represents the transfer of real income across periods in response to price changes. The third terni, -Q is the negative valuation effect on imports realized as a result of the (histortioii. Taken togetliei these three terms coml)rise flue colnl)dnsated siibstjtutjoui effects of the expected future tariff: all represent welfare losses.0
It is worth mentioning the effects on productioii as well. On the margin, olItJ)ut of the imported good is expected to rise by P Q11 while output of exports is ('xperte(l to fall by au equivalent amount,7 PQ21. The standard iiicchanjsm linking the oultJ)llt of illIJ)OI't5 aul(l exports is the wagerental ratio, w, winch decreases with higher import prires. The effect of cxec ted price changes on the composition of output can be seen in Figure 1 , the fanuiliar Saiwielson diagram. With zero expected future tariffs, the terms of trade stand at m (01r('sponding to an output mix at point B (where A represents complete specialization in exports and D lepreseults coiiiplete specialization in imports), given the capitahlal)oI' ratio of the economy, k. An increase in tariffs lowers the expected terms of trade to p'. lowers w and moves the outJ)lit iruix to point C, where more imports and fewer exports are produced than before.
6 The overall eWect of the expecte,l future tariff on welfare will he i gative provirliiig the staj,jlity coii,litin I - These two term.s canc exactly only for infinitesimal chialiges in relative prices. For discrete changes, the change in total olitl)flt, is zero only for first, orilrr aI)proxiinatioris Figure 1 The Effects of Expected Future Tariffs on
To see the effects of a change iii tile probability of a policy reversal on the current account we differentiate equation (10) and use equation (11) to get:
where a1 wE12H1D > 0
The first term in equation (12), a1, is tile sum of the colnpellsate(j ifltertempoi.al substitution effects in cOnsurnptioii; it tends to increase unambiguously the current account deficit. The intuition is that higher expected tariffs raise the aggregate level of I)rices in the second period and lower the real conslimptioli rate of interest, I + r = . The incentive to save is therefore reduced and consumption is transferred toward the first period. Also, the lower the credibility of the liberalization program, tile greater the Inisaliocatioji of real resources toward the inefficient import sector.
The second terni in equation (12), -a2,\, which is negative, reflects tile decrease in total income from the distortion weighted by the marginal I)ropensity to spend in period one and the expected tariff. A decrease in total income reduces real spending iii every period,8 which improves the current account. Notice that if tile tariff becomes too large, the second term will dominate, and the expected future tariff will improve the first-period current account. As we mentioned at the beginning of this section, tile negative income effects of large tariffs swamp the substitution effects, and ultimately result in current account balances that are lint sensible. We therefore use as an uPper bound on the size of tile tariff the point, at which tile slIi)stitlltioil effects are just cancelled out by tue income effects: 0 < , < . Note that at the margin = 0, the ilitertenhl)ol.al substitution effects, a1, induce a marginal current account deficit regardless of the size of ii,.
To find the approximate deviation in the level of the curreiit account fi•1 the zero expected tariff equilibrium, we integrate equatioii (12) to get an expression which is once again approximately
Nominal spiiding will the less than proportionately in the period with the tariff. anil fall al,solijtply in the other peo4.
a qua(IratiC:9
Equation (13) is graphed in Figure 2 . Given our restrietioll on r1,, the current account deficit is an increasing ftmction of the probability that the liberalization program will fail.'0
We can now solve for the rational expectations equilibrium of the model by coIlll)iniflg equations (3) and (13). A linear approximation to A in equatioli (3), is USe(I for the algebraic solution since the cmnulative normal (listribution is not tractal)le analytically:"
A V(X,c,z) a + a4z,
where 2 . _______ a3 = a3kJ4nin, Os,) < U.
Equations (3) and (13) now give equilibrium levels of credibility, A*. and the current accrnmt deficit,
The scaling restriction in equation (2) is sufficient to imply that a1a4 < 1, a1 > a2, and a3 < 1, so that A and are both positive. Also, from e(luat.iolls (11) and (13), we have that the loss in welfare due to the imperfect credibility is:
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The integration performed in equation (13) holds i and 02 fixed (white in fact they may vary with ), and therefore jelils an approximation to the current account. The most olwious siinpiificatin is in the deiioiniitator of on. which may be written explicitly as a function of ). The term rDfl1 C is equal to the marginal ProPe1y to save times the share of tariff revenues in total second-period spending, flC0 ,\ winch is small, and thus the deuiuuniitator chaiiges very little for small tariffs. We could perform the integration in equation ( This approximation is merely a convenience to avoid more complex algeicra. More intuition about the eqiulibrmm caii 1)C gained from a graph than from the algebraic solution. Figure 3 displays the current account and probability of collapse given in equations (13) and (5). As one might expect, greater iutert.empOral sul)stitutal)ilit.y in COflsUmI)tiOfl raises the edpulil)rium current account. and I)rol)a)iIity of collapse. From equation (17), the lack of credibility imposes larger welfare losses when these mtert.emporal transfers are more readily itiade. An increase in the world interest rate predictably reduces the current accouiit (leficit (since any given future surplus finances a smaller current deficit) and lowers ami 1T'. Fiiially, increases in uncertainty about. the future level of reserves (which raise the intercept an(l the slope of the P curve in equation (14)) yield a higher probability of collapse, a greater current account deficit, and a lower level of welfare.
A Second Best Argument for a Slower Rate of Trade Liberalization
The model above can now be use(I to investigate the justificat.ioii for positive first-period tariffs as a second-best tool for reducing the distortion introduced by a lack of perfect credibility. Such temporary tariffs may be added to the foregoing analysis by rewritiiig equations (8), (9), and (10) as follows:
where t represents the lump sum transfer of revenues front the first-period tariff. Equation (20) is similar to (10), the hats indicate that the trade deficit is eValUate(l at interiiational prices instead of at distorted domestic prices.'2 Differentiating equation (18) and using (19) we have the change in welfare resulting from a change in r1:
E1dW rDJ\ + r1c dr,
12 This complicates matters since the usual duality expressions imist. lie aitiended. For example, ott the production side first.
period production in international prices is, q pqj + q. A change in the tariff alters domestic 1,roduct.ion decisions, but international prices remain fixed, q = p,,qi I+q21. Tue domestic marginal rate oftrancfnri,tat.ion sat.icfles (p,+ri)qi i+q = 0.
The change in the value of domestically produceil goods is therefore given by q = -r1 qi p. The variable J on the right-hand side of equation (21) captures the intertemporal substitution effect. Although it arises from the introduction of a new first period tariff, it acts to rai.5e welfare.
Welfare improves because the real consumption rate of interest, (which is "too" low due to the anticipation of future tariffs), rises with r1. Consumption is theii shifted toward the future and the current account improves. Though the intertemporal distortion created l)y low credibility is mitigated by the imposition of r1, there are obvious costs: a new (histortion in the first period is introduced. The second term in equation (21) captures the reduction iii welfare attributable to the intratemporal distortions produced by the first-period tariff. This term is 1)1oI)O1tiOflal to r1, so that, overall, a marginal first-period tariff teiids unambiguously to unprove welfare. Equation (21) also implies that there is a unique first-period tariff which maximizes welfare.
Setting (1W = 0, we have:
where
(24) Figure 4 shows a graph of r(), the welfare maximizing temporary tariff, which is strictly 1)ositive for all non-zero ). The reason r is increasing in A is that the higher is the probability of failure, the greater is the distortion in the consumption rate of interest, and the more it is worth the cost of incurring a second distortion (in the form of a tariff in period one) which will reduce the distortion in the real consumption rate of interest. For any given level of cre(hi1)ility, the government can raise welfare by liberalizing more slowly. The Optimal Tariff as a Function of the Probability of Reversal
/\
We now turn to the effects of temporary tariffs on the cnrreiit account deficit. By differentiating equation (20) with respect to r1 and using equation (22) . we have:
dr, where f rDc11H1E12r,
The terni a0 captures the iutert.Clfll)Oral effects of the first-period tariff on expenditure and welfare. The tariff shifts spending toward the second period as the real consumption rate of interest rises; a0 will be positive as long as r1 is not too large.'3 Tariffs today will therefore offset the suboptimal reduction in the real consumption rate of interest caused by 1)OsitiVe eXI)eCted tariffs tomorrow. The incentive to save increases and the current account. improves.'4
If we evaluate equation (25) at the optimal tariff as defined in equation (23), it can be shown that the current account improves for all r1 < r1. From this fact, it follows that the level of the temporary tariff which maximises the current account, call it. j, is greater thaii the level of the optimal temporary tariff, r1. This imiakes sense intuitively because for r1 expenditure is transferred on the margin toward the first period. Welfare imist alrea(Iy 1)e di'clining.
The approximate iniprovemdnt in the current account. (leficit froni positive first period tariffs can be obtamed by integrating eqiiatioii (25) over r1:
51\tore explicitly, o will be positive as long as:
T1 e, 2rc -+ -<1.
-nr where 4" is the share of tariff revenue in first period spending and !'! is the expecteil share of tariff revenue in second period.s)ending. A sufficient condition for this equatioii to hold is for tariff revenues to be less than 50 I)ercetit of nominal spending in each period.
14 The second parameter, c*, is less important for smaller r1. This term reflects changes iii current consurnptioii and production due to the temporary tariff. The sign of 4*7 is ambiguous, bt will lie positive as long as the interteinporal substitution effects are "large" in comparison with the first, prio4l ijitrateinporal substitiitioii effects. To make this l)rise, (*7 will he positive if:
It is convenient to define a function which allows us to see how changes in first-period tariffs affect the current account as ) varies:
(27') = -a2\ -a6r1 - Figure 5 demonstrates the effect on the current account of first-period tariffs (equation (27')).
An increase in the probability that the liberalization i)rogralll will collapse, from . to ., worsens the tradeoff between current account deficits and first-period tariffis. shifting the z curve out and to the right.15 Figure 6 shows how the tradeoff between current accoinit deficits and a lack of perfect credibility improves with the a(Iclition of sinaI! temporary tariffs. lii z-, -space, the z curve shifts down when first-period tariffs are imposed.
We now have three equations in three unknowns: the current account deficit, z, the probability of collapse of the liberalization program, ), and the oI)tuhlal tvnLporary tariff, r:
rA) = a..\ (20) = P(Rmin,ii,z) = a3 + 4Z.
(30) Figure 7 characterizes the welfare maximizing solution. In the upper right-hand quadrant are the P (equation (30)) and z (equation (28)) curves. They intersect initially at the instantaneous liberalizatioii equilibrium, point A. In the lower-right quadrant is a 45 degree line, mapping \ into itself. The third quadrant contains the r curve (equation (20)), which translates a given level of credibility into an implied optimal first-period tariff. Finally. in the upper left is the z curve in z-, ri-space (equation (28)), which reports the curiejit account, deficit associated with different first-period tariffs, given values of ) generated by intersections of the P and z curves in the first quadrant.
For simplicity this curve is drawn as downward sloping. At levels of r ahov(' the olt.iinal tariff, however, 07 l)CCOIflCS negative and the z curve, drawn in z, r1 space, begins to slope upward.
2 Figure 5 The Change in the Current Account from a Shift in the Probability of Reversal as a Function of First-Period Tariffs Figure 6 The Change in the Current Account from a Shift in First-Period Tariffs as a Function of the ProbabilitY of Reversal one shift the z curve in the firt quadrant down. This defines a new intersection of the P and z curves at a lower current account deFicit and lower , marked l)y J)oint B. Moving in a clockwise direction into the third quadrant, the r curve gives the optimal temporary tariff. In the upper left quadrant, the value of the optimal tariff is translated into a corresl)onding current accoirnt deficit.
If the deficit is the same as that generated by the intersection of the z and P curves, we have found the fixed point B. If it is not, we try a higher (or lower) r, shifting the z curve further down (or up). The fixed-point values, r1, z, give the optimal speed of liberalization, the optimal current accoimt deficit, and the resulting degree of credibility, given the underlying parameters R,
It is straightforward to show that 0 < z < z, 0 < ,\** < , and 0 < rr. A liberalization program which removes tariffs directly and has less than perfect credibility can be improved upon by slowing the speed at which tariffs arc reduced.
It is also possible to do some comparative statics with this model, An increase in the level of reserves, will raise Rmj, and lower z, .A, rr as shown in Figure 8 . Here the P curve shifts left (its slope decreases as well) anti the z curve in z-, r1-space shifts down, since the improvement in credibility implies that at any given level of r1, the curreiit account deficit will be lower. The initial optimum is given by A, r1 and z and the new optimum by r and z*. Greater international liquidity, evidenced by a lower level of will have the same qualitative effect on the equilibrium: the P curve shifts to the left as the program's susceptibility to trade balance shocks improves. The higher the level of reserves, and the easier it is to negotiate additional international lending, the greater the optimal speed of liberalization. An increase in the variance of unexpected shocks to reserves, , shifts the P curve in a differeiit maimer, shown in Figure 9 . The result is that z, A, r1 all increase: the optimal rate liberalization is even slower.
It is worth stressing that on average imiore resources are devoted to exj)orts in period two when the liberalization proceeds gradually thaii whmemi the liberalization is immediate. In terms of Figure 1 , temporary tariffs cause a smaller decrease iii the expected relative p11cc of exports and wage/rental ratio, so that the shift in resources toward imports is less pronounced. This reallocation of resources is important since one uiotivation for undertaking a liberalizatiomi program in the first t6BCcaUSe the algebraic solutions for , , and r are rnml"'rsome aiiil yi'hl no athIif.ijjal insights, they are omitted here, 
Expected Collapse of a Liberalization Program when Reserves are Rationed
The previous section explored the kind of difficulties whicli confront a less than fully credible removal of tariffs when domestic reserves are made available to fiuiaiice the private sector's current account deficit. Frequently, however, reserves are rationed by the government, so that additional borrowing by the private sector is not I)OSSil)le. In this section we look at the effects of an incredible liberalization when the current account is fixed by the authorities. The private sector's excess demand for loans in the initial I)eriod is vitiated1 iii the lIio(Iel 1)elow by a rise in the domestic interest rate, which compensates individuals who would otherwise want to consume more in the first periO(I. The budget constraint now becomes 
where the hats indicate that the current account is fixed in terimis of international currency. To see how the domestic discount rate varies in respomise to positive expecte(1 future tariffs we differentiate equations (31) and (32) using (33): N=llCTT.>o
V=E2HI_QI>0
Applying Cramer's rule to equation (34), some algebra yields the solutions:
The determinant of the matrix on the left-hand side of (34), , is negative as shown in Appendix 2.
Appendix 3 gives gives explicit limits On the size of r4, to guarantee that EV < 0 in equation (36).
It is easy to be convinced on an intuitive level that welfare should fall. As individuals' expectations of future tariffs increase, the expected distortion rises and so welfare is reduced. This seemingly obvious result is complicated in the above equation because the domestic interest rate is free to fluctuate in response to pressure on the current account, and will 1)resumably do so in a way that tends to raise welfare al)ove what it would have been if it were fixed. Equation (37) gives the response of the interest rate to changes in expected future tariffs.
The lack of perfect credibility lowers time consumption rate of interest and encourages consumption, causing the current account constraint to bind more severely. Consequelitly, interest rates must rise in order to compensate individuals for the iltimediate consumption they otherwise would desire.17 Figure 10 demonstrates this mechanism using the P and z curves from the previous section. Now, however time ex ante current account is pegged at Z. At point B time current account Constraint
If the expected tariff becomes too large, however, thou once again the luegative welfare effects swamp the results: desired first-period consumption falls, the current account constraint becomes less binding. ais.l the iuuterest, rate fails. Equation (37) -. The equilibrium, ,\ ( point C), has associated with it a domestic interest rate which exceeds the world rate (point D). Althoigh it is not tractable analytically, it is in principle possible to integrate (37) from -to to get
aL(Z,) 9L(z,\) From equation (37), -a---< 0 and ----> 0. Figure 10 also shows the effect on the domestic interest rate of a change in the borrowing constraint from 2 to 2'. Whieji the current accoimt fixed at 2', interest rates begin to rise at point E' instead of point E. At a given level of credibility, the equilibriuni domestic interest rate is falls wlieii the capital constraint is loosened: point D' implies a lower interest rate than D, Welfare improves unambiguously.
A Slower Rate of Liberalization when Reserves are Rationed
Now we can proceed to analyze the optimal speed of liberihiz,atioii when reserves are rationed.
The budget constraint is similar to equation (31):
with t representing first-period tariff revenues. The current account is given by equation (33):
Taking the derivative of equations (39) and (42), and using equations (40) and (41) we have:
Equation (43) yields:
Setting (45) equal to zero and solving for the optimal tariff iii periO(l one, WC Ol)taifl
a 10 where = -r,V(JT
The optimal tariff is once agaili increasing and approxiinat.'ly liiicar iii : wheii credibility is low, more can be gained from instituting larger first-pcriod tariffs.'8 ln equation (48), jO appears to have an ambiguous sign. A simple coIit.intity argument serves to show that it must be positive. The fact that 1e, is greater than zero implies that the change in welfare from a first period tariff, evaluated when rj is zero, is unambiguously positive. As long as the first, (lerivative of welfare is coxitinitoils, snisli increases in the level of r1 will raise the level of welfare. Thus, at least for small first. period tariffs, °iO i positiVi'.
Next we consider the behavior of iiiteret rates when tariffs are imposed in the initial period.
From equation (46) we have: dD = iI 12Ti, (50) dr, where
Equation (50) implies that interest rates will fall as a result of higher temporary tariffs provided that r1 < u. A simple intuitive argument serves to denionstrite that the domestic interest rate remains above the world rate at the optimal tariff, r. The only benefit to raising r1 comes from a decline in the interest rate ( is fixed). The cost of such a policy is the temporary distortion that tariffs induce. At the point where r1 = ll, the benefits of raising tariffs further are zero, but the costs of the added distortion are positive. It follows that welfare can be at a maximum only when the benefits are still positive, i.e. that T1 < Ji-.
From equation (50) we can integrate over r1 to obtain: L(2, , r1) L(, ) -a11T1 + a12r, (52) which gives the level of the interest rate for given values of , r1, and 2.
We can now solve for the optimal first-period tariff and the equilibrium level of credibility and domestic interest rate. There are three equations and three unknowns:
The solution is displayed in Figure 11 . Note that is detcrxiiiiiecj by 2 and equation (53), so that the above system is recursive. Given ), equation (54) yields the o1)timal tariff, rj. Equation (55) then gives the equilibrium domestic interest rate, i. When flit' current account is fixed by government fiat and domestic interest rates are consequently driven above world rates, gradual liberalization appears to be the optimal policy in the face of imperfect credibility.
In many cases, a reduction in the speed of liberalization will ease pressure on the current account constraint, and in some cases the constraint will no longer bind. If this occurs, we are in the situation described in section 2, and the tendency for tciiipoiary tariffs to improve welfare and the efficiency of resource allocation is strengthened over and above the argumeiits presented in this section, since first-period tariffs purchase both reductions iii the doiiiestic interest rate as well as improvements in credibility.
Conclusions
When the private sector can obtain hard currency to huiaiicc its desired current account deficit, an imperfectly credible and immediate attempt to liberalize trade results in a positive current account deficit and rational positive probability that the liberalization will ultimately fail. Positive expected future tariffs tend to increase future production opportuiiities in the import sector relative to the export sector. The imperfect credibility built into our imiodel thus tends to undermine one important motivation for removing tariffs to 1)egin with: to shift 1roductive resources out of the protected import sector and into the efficient export sector.
A slower rate of trade liberalization can increase welfare over the equilibrium in (1), as long as the temporary first-period tariffs are not too large. This equilibrium dominates that of the instantaneous liberalization in that the current account deficit is smaller, z < z, the probability of the program's failure is lower, < ), and welfare is greater. There is a unique (positive) first-period tariff which maximizes intertemporal welfare. Second period 1)rOduCtiofl in the import sector is on average lower with such temporary tariffs. Thus, a mimore gradual S1)Ced of liberalization may actually help encourage a shift of resources from the import sector into the export sector.
For the case in which the current account is collstraine(l by rationing of reserves, imperfect credibility translates into domestic interest rates that are above those in the rest of the world.
We show that in such circumstances, an immediate and comI)lete tariff reduction is inferior to a more gradual approach. When such temporary tariffs are imposed, the domestic, interest rate is lower than it would be under instantaneous liberalization (but it remains aboVe the world rate).
Time behavior of the interest rate in this instance indicates that it. is particularly problematic for countries with foreign exchange constraints to liberalize successfully. When high interest rates force down the capital stock in the export sector, it becomes all time niore difficult to obtain fresh loans.
Thus, in the common case in which a current account constraint is a coiiseiuciicc of a low level of reserves and too little international liquidity, an incre(Iible Iil)erali/,atiOli I)10gra111 iiiay usii further into the future the day whemi voluntary lending and borrowing call be reSlUfle(1.
Appendix 1
In this appendix we investigate fnrther the treatment of uncertainty used in the text. Our basic problem is to determine the comparative statics of the model discussed in section two when A, the probability that the liberalization program will fail, changes. Because the Consumption and production problems for our sinai! country are formally identical, we need to look at a single example only. Here we investigate the maximization of period two subutility: max {r(C.m, C,.) : P,0 C,,, + (y = y} , (A1.1) where g is second-period real income, which is taken as fixed by the consumer. By substituting in the budget constraint, we can rewrite (A1.1) as max (r (C,,,, -,, C, ) }.
(Al.2)
The first order condition is:
where Fm = E[J = p,, + Am-n. To find expected utility, we take Taylor series expalisions around Fm + = (F2 + r222a2c.,)pm (7,,,2F22 . (A1.6) 'For simplicity, we limit this demo,istratjo,, to second order expansions. Providing that the higher order de%tives of t exist, longer expansions still satisfy proposition A.! below.
To find the pure substitution effect, we take the total derivative of equation (Al.6) with respect to A. The resulting expression contains derivatives of expected utility, and income and substitution effects. To eliminate the income effects, we a1)prOXilflat.e the level of eXI)eCted utility by a Taylor series expansion, E[F1 F + 2cr2, (Al.7) and take the derivative of (A1.7) with respect to A for a givell level of expected utility. Combining the derivatives of equations (Al.6) and (Al.7) yields the pure SU1)StitlltiOfl effect:
where the first term on the right-hand side is the certainty equivalent substitution effect, and 'P is 0(0) in r: The sign and magnitude of 'P will depend upon the specific utility function chosen. Notice that, by continuing the Taylor series expansions in equations (Al.4) and (Al.7) out i)CyOlld the second order, 'P would remain 0(0) in r. We then have:
Proposition Al. If < 0, then a necessary and sufficient condition for the own substitution effect to be negative is that < -P2W. If 'P_i 0, then no restriction on r, is required.
Proof. Note by inspection that if 'P 0, then the usual convexity assumptions imply that equation (Al.8) is negative. If, on the other hand. 'I' < 0, the restriction in Proposition Al is necessary and sufficient.
Appendix 2
Here we outline the conditions required to show that the determinant on the right-hand side of (34) The last term in equation (36) 
